On the empirical level, the research project examines the question of why national constitutional courts and apex courts become central fora for the resolution of TSC (hereinafter the term constitutional court is used for both types of courts). The hypothesis is that constitutional courts are addressed because the parliamentary way does not appear strategically reasonable due to the limited scope of action national parliaments are witnessing during the Eurozone Crisis. At the same time, the prospects of contesting the validity of austerity measures or measures of currency hedging before European courts are considered minimal regarding their contained jurisprudence. By contrast, social actors perceive national constitutional courts as appropriate fora for achieving the symbolical recognition of a TSC.
From a political science perspective, the second subproject analyzes which judicial and political opportunity structures have created the current situation where national constitutional courts are perceived as adequate fora for the resolution of TSC. These opportunity structures are likely to vary according to the conflict types differentiated in subproject 1.
The second subproject also studies how social conflicts have to be articulated and represented in order to be dealt with as constitutional issues and how the specific judicial form of representation of conflict retroacts on the political dynamics of these conflicts. In this context one of the main concerns is to disclose the relationship between conflict resolution by constitutional courts and the politicization of transnational solidarity conflicts as conflicts about the legitimacy of public authority within the EU.